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Abstract 
The key issue in the hedonic price theory is that although the literature emphasises the 
intrinsic nonlinearity in the relationship between house prices and housing characteristics, 
very little theoretical guidance is provided regarding the more appropriate mathematical 
specification for the hedonic price function. Thus, most empirical studies make use of 
flexible functional forms or simple linear models which possess a direct economic 
meaningfulness. This theoretical paper attempts to fill this gap by using the Mortensen-
Pissarides matching model to show the nonlinearity of the hedonic price function and 
provide insights on the more appropriate functional relationship between prices and 
attributes. 
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 1 
1. Introduction 
Although the economic theory of hedonic prices (Lancaster, 1966; Rosen, 1974) is well 
known and not in question,
1
 it provides very little theoretical guidance on the appropriate 
functional relationship between prices and attributes in the hedonic price function 
(Malpezzi, 2003; Taylor, 2003), and thus in empirical studies researchers have used 
flexible functional forms, such as Box-Cox functions, or simple parametric models (Anglin 
and Gençay, 1996).
2
 
The hedonic price literature almost unanimously underlines the intrinsic 
nonlinearity in the relationship between house prices and housing characteristics, though 
nothing is known a priori about a specific functional form (Anglin and Gençay, 1996; 
Ekeland, Heckman and Nesheim, 2002, 2004; Parmeter, Henderson and Kumbhakar, 2007; 
Haupt, Schnurbus and Tschernig, 2010). Nevertheless, while the literature suggests that 
the equilibrium price function is nonlinear, most empirical studies make use of linear 
models, thus relying on an influential simulation study by Cropper, Deck and McConnell 
(1988).
3
 
This “puzzle” is due to the absence of theoretical groundwork regarding the more 
appropriate functional form to use in the hedonic price models (see e.g. Anglin and 
Gençay, 1996; Malpezzi, 2003). According to Rosen (1974), there is no reason for the 
hedonic price function to be linear; in fact, the linearity of the hedonic price function is 
unlikely as long as the marginal cost of attributes increases for sellers and it is not possible 
to untie packages. Indeed, Ekeland, Heckman and Nesheim (2002, 2004) demonstrate that 
nonlinearity is a generic property of the hedonic price function. Hence, a linear model 
would be a special case for the hedonic price function (Kuminoff, Parmeter and Pope, 
2008, 2009). However, the nonlinearity is basically a general concept and may imply the 
use of several kinds of empirical models. 
                                                 
1
 For an exhaustive overview see Sheppard (1999) and Malpezzi (2003). 
2
 Often linear, semi-logarithmic or log-log models are chosen. These are characterised as being easily 
interpretable, and the estimated parameters possess a direct economic meaningfulness (Maurer, Pitzer, and 
Sebastian, 2004). In particular, in the linear model, the parameters give absolute prices for the unit of the 
attributes. 
3
 Cropper, Deck and McConnell (1988) found that when all attributes are observed, linear and quadratic Box-
Cox forms produce the most accurate estimates of marginal attribute prices; whereas, when some attributes 
are unobserved or are replaced by proxies, linear and linear Box-Cox functions perform best. 
 2 
As a rule, the use of a particular empirical model rather than another should be 
indicated by economic theory (Stock and Watson, 2003). Indeed, theoretical models are 
critical in determining an accurate and consistent econometric model: empirical analysis 
alone cannot replace conceptual reasoning when estimating the relationships of most 
economic phenomena (Can, 1992; Brown and Ethridge, 1995). 
In order to build a theoretical foundation for empirical models, this paper develops 
a matching model à la Mortensen-Pissarides (see e.g. the textbook by Pissarides, 2000) 
and shows that the hedonic pricing equation is nonlinear. In particular, under the realistic 
assumption of decentralised housing markets with important search and matching 
frictions (Leung and Zhang, 2011), in this model the equilibrium price function is nonlinear 
with a closed-form solution. Furthermore, this paper provides empirical evidence for the 
non-linear effect of housing characteristics on selling price. 
Several papers examined the widely used hedonic pricing equation (see e.g. Epple, 
1987; Bartik, 1987; Kahn and Lang, 1988; Palmquist, 1988; Brachinger, 2003; Ekeland, 
Heckman and Nesheim, 2002, 2004). Moreover, there have been attempts to develop a 
dynamic theory of hedonic prices (Kwong and Leung, 2000; Kan, Kwong and Leung, 2004; 
Leung, Wong and Cheung, 2007).
4
 However, these important contributions did not 
consider the search and matching frictions. In fact, what distinguishes our paper from the 
previous efforts is that it is based on a search-matching model, arguably more appropriate 
for a “matching market” like the housing market.
5
 
Also, the proposed housing market matching model allows a major drawback of 
the standard hedonic pricing theory to be overcome: the assumption of competitive 
markets. Indeed, in the standard hedonic pricing theory, markets are assumed to be 
sufficiently thick (i.e. markets with a large amount of trading) so that implicit or hedonic 
prices, i.e. the shadow prices of the characteristics, are revealed to economic agents 
through trades that differ only in terms of a single attribute. However, this is hardly true: 
                                                 
4
 In particular, Leung, Wong and Cheung (2007) develop a dynamic theory of hedonic prices based on the 
general equilibrium asset pricing model à la Lucas which holds not only at the steady state but in principle at 
any point in time. 
5
 Peters (2007) develops a suitably modified version of hedonic equilibrium using the limits of Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium from finite versions of the game to determine the out of equilibrium payoffs. The goal of this 
paper is to address the realistic situation in which characteristics of traders on both sides of the market are 
endogenous. This formalisation can be applied to any matching markets (labour, marriage and housing). 
 3 
markets become increasingly thin when traded goods are increasingly heterogeneous, and 
the implicit or hedonic prices as well as the "true" market value of the good are not known 
(Harding, Rosenthal and Sirmans, 2003; Harding, Knight and Sirmans, 2003; Cotteleer and 
Gardebroek, 2006).
6
 In fact, the house price realistically depends not only on the housing 
characteristics but also on the search and matching frictions and bargaining power of the 
parties. Indeed, several recent papers have just used the search-matching models to study 
the housing market (among others, Diaz and Jerez, 2009; Novy-Marx, 2009; Piazzesi and 
Schneider, 2009; Genesove and Han, 2010; Leung and Zhang, 2011; Peterson, 2012). 
However, none of these existing works has considered how to take advantage of this 
approach to derive an appropriate functional form for the hedonic price equation.
7
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 presents the housing 
market matching model; section 3 gives insights on the more appropriate functional form 
to use in the hedonic price models, while section 4 shows the empirical plausibility of the 
theoretical result; finally, section 5 concludes the work. 
 
2. A baseline matching model of housing market 
We adopt a standard matching framework à la Mortensen-Pissarides (see e.g. Pissarides, 
2000) with random search and prices determined by Nash bargaining. We believe that the 
behaviour of the housing market can be properly formalised by the Mortensen-Pissarides 
matching model. Indeed, the random matching assumption is absolutely compatible with 
a market where the formal distinction between the demand and supply side is very subtle; 
whereas, bargaining is a natural outcome of thin, local and decentralised markets for 
heterogeneous goods. 
                                                 
6
 According to Arnott (1989), the real estate market is thin because of the indivisibility and multi-
dimensional heterogeneity of housing units. Although the model is extended to treat costly search, central 
in Arnott's (1989) modelling framework is the analysis of tenant search and landlord behaviour in a (rental) 
market with tenant idiosyncratic tastes. Thin (rental) markets are in fact modelled by assuming an 
idiosyncratic component to household's tastes over housing units. Given such idiosyncratic tastes, tenants 
search for their preferred unit and are willing to pay a premium for it. This confers monopoly power on 
landlords, which they exploit by setting rents above costs. In the long run, however, free entry and exit lead 
to zero profits, with vacancies as the equilibrating mechanism. 
7
 Unlike the quoted studies, we follow the standard matching framework à la Mortensen-Pissarides without 
any deviation from the baseline model. 
 4 
Since we are interested in selling price, the market of reference is the 
homeownership market rather than the rental market. In this market, if a contract is 
legally binding (as hypothesised) it is no longer possible to return to the circumstances 
preceding the bill of sale, unless a new and distinct contractual relationship is set up. In 
matching model jargon this means that the destruction rate of a specific buyer-seller 
match does not exist and the value of an occupied home for a seller is simply given by the 
selling price. 
Buyers (b) expend costly search effort to find a house, while sellers (s) hold 2h ≥  
houses of which 1h −  are on the market, i.e. vacancies ( v ) are simply given by 
( ) 0s1hv >⋅−= .8 It is therefore possible that a buyer can become a seller, and that a 
seller can become a buyer. Indeed, buyers today are in fact potential sellers tomorrow 
(Leung, Leong and Wong, 2006). 
The expected values of a vacant house (V ) and of buying a house ( H ) are given by:
9
 
( ) [ ]VPθqarV −⋅+−=                                   [1] 
( ) [ ]PHxθgerH −−⋅+−=                                   [2] 
where v/bθ ≡  is the housing market tightness from the sellers’ standpoint, while ( )θq  
and ( )θg  are, respectively, the (instantaneous) probability of filling a vacant house and of 
buying a home. The standard hypothesis of constant returns to scale in the matching 
function, { }bv,mm = , is adopted (see Pissarides, 2000; Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001), 
since it is also used in the (recent) search models of housing market (Diaz and Jerez, 2009; 
Novy-Marx, 2009; Piazzesi and Schneider, 2009; Genesove and Han, 2010; Leung and 
Zhang, 2011; Peterson, 2012). Hence, the properties of these functions are 
straightforward: ( ) 0θq' <  and ( ) 0θg' > .10 The terms a  and e  represent, respectively, 
                                                 
8
 Since there is no rental market, this is a reasonable assumption. Alternatively, one could assume that the 
sellers hold h ≥ 1 houses of which h are on the market, and that the buyers are the homeless. This case 
would not change the results of the analysis. 
9
 Time is continuous and individuals are risk neutral, live infinitely and discount the future at the exogenous 
interest rate r > 0. As usual in matching-type models, the analysis is restricted to the stationary state. 
10
 Standard technical assumptions are postulated: ( ) ( ) ∞==
∞→→ θglimθqlim θ0θ , and 
( ) ( ) 0θqlimθglim θ0θ == ∞→→ . By definition, markets with frictions require positive and finite tightness, i.e. 
∞<< θ0 , since for 0θ =  the vacancies are always filled, whereas for ∞=θ  the home-seekers immediately 
find a vacant house. 
 5 
the costs sustained by sellers for the advertisement of vacancies and the effort (in 
monetary terms) made by buyers to find and visit the largest possible number of houses. If 
a contract is stipulated, the risk neutral buyer gets a linear benefit from the property, 
which coincides with the value of the house (abandoning the home searching value) and 
pays the sale price P  to the seller (who abandons the value of finding another buyer). 
Intuitively, the value of the house, and thus the buyer’s benefit, can be higher or lower 
according to the mix of desired and undesidered housing characteristics (not all 
characteristics are in fact desired).
11
 For the sake of simplicity, we assume that all 
characteristics are desired. Hence, the greater the housing characteristics, the higher the 
value of the house (i.e. the buyer’s benefit). 
The endogenous variables that are determined simultaneously at equilibrium are 
market tightness ( θ ) and sale price ( P ). The “zero-profit” or “free-entry” condition 
normally used by matching models (see Pissarides, 2000) yields the first key relationship 
of the model, in which market tensions are a positive function of price.
12
 By using the 
equilibrium condition 0V =  in [1], we obtain: 
( ) ( ) a
P
θq
θq
1 1
=≡
−
           [3] 
with 0Pθ/ >∂∂ . This positive relationship is very intuitive (recall that ( ) 0θq' < ): in fact, if 
the price increases, more vacancies will be on the market. 
Instead, the selling price is obtained by solving the following optimisation condition, 
the so-called Nash bargaining solution usually used for decentralised markets (recall that 
in equilibrium 0V = ): 
( ) ( ){ }γ1γ PHxVPargmax P −−−⋅−=  
( ) ( )PHxγ1
γ
P −−⋅
−
=⇒  
( )HxγP −⋅=⇒  
                                                 
11
 Air and noise pollution, bad neighbourhoods are examples of “undesidered” housing characteristics which 
decrease the value of the house. 
12
 The free entry condition for the sellers implies that there is no constraint on the number of sellers. In fact, 
in the model, anyone holding more than one house becomes a seller and pays the advertising costs. 
 6 
where 1γ0 <<  is the share of bargaining power of sellers. Entering into a contractual 
agreement obviously implies that Hx > , θ∀  for the buyer. Hence, the selling price is 
always positive. By using the previous result, i.e. ( ) ( ) P
γ
γ1
PHx ⋅
−
=−− , in equation [2], 
eventually we get an explicit expression for the selling price: 
( )
( ) ( )γ1θgr
erxγ
P
−⋅+
+⋅
=
                                   
[4] 
with 0θP/ <∂∂ . As regards the economic meaning of equation [4], if the market tightness 
increases, the effect of the well-known congestion externalities on the sellers’ side (see 
Pissarides, 2000) will lower the price (recall that ( ) 0θg' > ). 
This simple model is able to reproduce the observed joint behaviour of prices and 
time-on-the-market (see e.g. Leung, Leong, and Chan, 2002). In fact, with a probability of 
filling a vacant house of ( )θq , the (expected) time-on-the-market is ( ) 1θq − . Hence, from 
equation [3], the house with a higher selling price has a longer time on the market (since 
( ) 1θq −  is increasing in θ ); whereas, from equation [4], the longer the time-on-the-market 
(i.e. the higher the market tightness) the lower the sale price. 
It is straightforward to obtain from [3] that when P  tends to zero (infinity), θ  tends 
to zero (infinity), as ( )θq  tends to infinity (zero). Consequently, given the negative slope 
of [4] and the fact that price is always positive, only one long-term equilibrium deriving 
from the intersection of the two curves exists in the model. Finally, normalising the 
population in the housing market to the unit, sb1 += , and using both the definition of 
vacancies, ( ) s1hv ⋅−= , and the value of equilibrium tightness ( v/bθ*θ =≡ ), the model 
is closed in a very simple manner.
13
 
 
3. Hedonic price and functional form specification 
The two key equations of the model are the free-entry condition, i.e. equation [3], and the 
Nash bargaining solution, i.e. equation [4]. Indeed, the latter is none other than the 
                                                 
13
 Given the equilibrium value of market tightness, it is in fact straightforward to solve this system of three 
equations in three unknowns (v, b, s). 
 7 
hedonic price function of the model. As suggested by the hedonic price theory (Rosen, 
1974), the selling price is a (positive) function of (desired) housing characteristics. From 
[4], in fact, P  depends positively on the value of the house, which in turn depends 
positively on the housing characteristics. Hence, the hedonic or implicit price is positive 
and the equilibrium hedonic price function has a closed-form solution. 
However, unlike the standard hedonic price theory, the sale price of this model 
depends not only on the housing characteristics but also on the market tensions, 
bargaining power of the parties and search costs. In particular, market tensions are an 
endogenous variable of the model. Hence, in order to express the hedonic price function 
only in terms of exogenous variables we need to combine the equations [3]-[4]. By using a 
Cobb-Douglas functional form (also used by Novy-Marx, 2009; Piazzesi and Schneider, 
2009; Peterson, 2012), i.e. αα1 bvm ⋅=
− , where α is the elasticity of the matching function 
with respect to the share of buyers, we get the following implicit function for selling price: 
( ) γeγrxPγ-1
a
P
r
α
α1
+=⋅








⋅





+
−
                                 [5] 
being ( ) ααα1 θ
v
bv
θq
−
−
=
⋅
= , ( ) ααα1 θ
b
bv
θg
−
−
=
⋅
=
1 , and 
α
1
a
P
θ 





=  from [3]. Total 
differentiation of equation [5] with respect to P  and x  thus yields: 
( ) ( ) dxγrdP
a
γ-1
a
P
α
α-1
Pγ-1
a
P
dPr
1
α
α1
α
α1
⋅=⋅








⋅





⋅





⋅+⋅





+⋅
−
−−
 
( ) ( )








⋅





⋅





⋅+⋅





+
=≡⇒
−
−−
a
γ-1
a
P
α
α-1
Pγ-1
a
P
r
γr
p
dx
dP
1
α
α1
α
α1
                                              
[6] 
As a result, the hedonic price function is non-linear even if the buyer is risk neutral and 
acquires a linear benefit from the property: in fact, the implicit or hedonic price p
 
depends on x , since ( )Pfp =
 
and ( )xfP = . This is in line with the hedonic price literature 
which suggests that the equilibrium price function should be nonlinear. 
 8 
The key role of market tightness on the shape of the hedonic price function is 
straightforward: in fact, the selling price depends on the matching probabilities between 
seller and buyer which are, intuitively, non-linear (for example, an increase in tightness 
increases at decreasing rates the probability of finding a home). Also, the equilibrium 
market tightness depends on housing characteristics through the selling price (see 
equation 3). In short, unlike the standard hedonic pricing model, housing characteristics 
affect the selling price both directly and indirectly (through the market tightness). Thus, 
the combination of these effects leads to the non-linearity of the hedonic price function. 
For the sake of simplicity, we use a reasonable and common value of α = 0.5.
14
 
Hence, the hedonic or implicit price of this model collapses to: 
( ) ( )





⋅+⋅





+
=≡
a
γ-1
Pγ-1
a
P
r
γr
p
dx
dP
                                                                                         
[6’]
 
since the selling price is increasing in the house value (namely, the hedonic price is 
positive), we may also state that ( ) 0xp'P/dxd 22 <≡ . Hence, this theoretical model also 
gives a precise statement about the form of the hedonic price function: it in fact suggests 
an increasing relationship at decreasing rates between selling price and housing 
characteristics.
 15
 
 
4. Empirical testing 
In order to test the empirical plausibility of an increasing relationship at decreasing rates 
between selling price and housing characteristics, we use the benchmark parametric 
model proposed by Anglin and Gençay (1996), and also considered by Parmeter, 
Henderson and Kumbhakar (2007), and Haupt, Schnurbus and Tschernig (2010).
16
 
                                                 
14
 See Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). Indeed, Piazzesi and Schneider (2009) use a very similar value for 
the U.S. housing market, namely 0.57. 
15
 It is straightforward to show that the result holds for any value of α. 
16
 Haupt, Schnurbus and Tschernig (2010), in particular, show that the null hypothesis of correct 
specification of the linear parametric model proposed by Anglin and Gençay (1996), against the alternative 
of parametric misspecification, cannot be rejected at any reasonable significance level. Furthermore, they 
also show that the parametric model predicts better than the nonparametric specification proposed by 
Parmeter, Henderson and Kumbhakar (2007). 
 9 
The Anglin-Gençay benchmark parametric model is characterised by many binary 
variables and the relationship between the dependent variable (selling price), the 
continuous regressor (the lot size) and the discrete variables is represented in terms of 
relative changes (elasticity).
17
 In this empirical analysis, we employ data from their study 
(also used by Verbeek, 2004). Details about this dataset are reported in the Appendix 
(now at the end).
18
 
Following the benchmark parametric model by Anglin and Gencay (1996), we 
transform all the quantitative variables (lot size, bedrooms, bathrooms, stories) into 
natural logarithm; whereas, the dummy variables, by definition, cannot be transformed 
(Maurer, Pitzer and Sebastian, 2004). The econometric model is thus the following:
19
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
ii11i10i9i8i7i6
i5i4i3i2i10i
εGARβPRNβCACβGWHβFIBβRERβ            
DRIβSTOlnβBATHlnβBEDlnβLOTlnββPln
+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+
⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+=
                 [7] 
where 
iP  is the selling price of the house i ; DRI, RER, FIB, GWH, CAC and PRN are dummy 
variables for driveway, recreational room, finished basement, gas water heating, central 
air conditioning and preferred neighbourhood; GAR, BED, BATH and STO are the number 
of garages, bedrooms, full bathrooms and stories; and LOT is the lot size (in square feet). 
Finally, iε  is the stochastic error term. 
Neglecting the binary variables,
20
 we focus on jβ , with 1,2,3,4j = . It follows that 
with 1β0 j <<  the relationship is increasing at decreasing rates, while with 1β j >  the 
relationship is increasing at increasing rates, finally with 1β j =  the relationship is linear. 
The OLS results show that the coefficients jβ  have positive signs and are 
statistically significant, i.e. 0βj ≠ . Furthermore, the coefficients jβ  range between 0.089 
(number of bedrooms) and 0.313 (lot size), i.e. 1β0 j << , and the null hypothesis of 
                                                 
17
 Data on housing characteristics, in fact, typically consists of one continuous regressor (the lot size) and 
many ordered and unordered categorical variables (Parmeter, Henderson and Kumbhakar, 2007; Haupt, 
Schnurbus and Tschernig, 2010). 
18
 The STATA file is available at: http://eu.wiley.com//legacy/wileychi/verbeek2ed/datasets.html. 
19
 Because of the presence of the value 0, the natural logarithm is not used for the variable number of 
garage places. 
20
 The coefficients for the binary variables give the surcharge which is to be paid relative to a property 
without those attributes. For more details about the economic interpretation of the effect of dummy 
variables on the dependent variable in natural logarithmic form see Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980). 
 10 
1β j =  is rejected at any reasonable significance level, thus confirming the nonlinearity of 
the hedonic price function. Finally, not surprisingly the null hypothesis of “no omitted 
variables” can not be rejected at any reasonable significance level (for details about the 
results see the Appendix).
21
 
Hence, an increasing relationship at decreasing rates may be the most appropriate 
functional form for the hedonic price function (as suggested by the theoretical model). 
Finally, this theoretical framework may also be used to study how errors in 
measuring marginal attribute prices vary with the form of the hedonic price function; in 
this way, the simulation strategy developed by Cropper, Deck and McConnell (1988), and 
updated by Kuminoff, Parmeter and Pope (2008, 2009), may take the (equilibria of the) 
housing market with search and matching frictions into account, thus relaxing the 
unrealistic assumption of competitive housing markets.
22
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
The nonlinearity in the relationship between house price and housing characteristics is a 
recognised starting point for the hedonic price literature, though nothing is known a priori 
about a specific functional form. Indeed, the economic theory of hedonic prices provides 
very little theoretical guidance on the appropriate functional relationship between prices 
and attributes in the hedonic price function. This is a very significant shortcoming for 
empirical studies, since theoretical models are critical in determining accurate and 
consistent econometric models and the use of a particular empirical model rather than 
another should be indicated by economic theory. As a consequence, most empirical 
studies make use of flexible functional forms or simple models which possess a direct 
economic meaningfulness. This paper develops a baseline matching model in which the 
nonlinearity of the hedonic price function emerges as an equilibrium outcome in a market 
                                                 
21
 On the shape of the hedonic price function (precisely, on the estimate of the marginal price of floor space) 
see the interesting discussion between Coulson (1992, 1993) and Colwell (1993). 
22
 In the quoted studies, the marginal bid of consumers (namely, the “true” marginal price paid) for each 
attribute is obtained by simulations of housing market equilibria. Subsequently, equilibrium housing prices, 
together with housing attributes, provide the data used to estimate various functional forms for the hedonic 
price function. Finally, errors in estimating marginal prices are calculated by comparing the consumer's 
equilibrium marginal bid with the gradient of the hedonic price function. 
 11 
with search and matching frictions. Furthermore, it provides empirical evidence for the 
non-linear effect of housing characteristics on selling price. 
A drawback of this analysis, however, must be acknowledged: the “gap” between 
the theoretical model (which derives a complicated non-linear function) and its empirical 
counterpart (in which many binary regressors are used). It follows that the theoretical 
model introduces a number of parameters which can not be tested for (above all, the 
bargaining power of the parties).
23
 The explanation (justification) for this difference is that 
the aim of the empirical part of the paper is to offer clear evidence for the particular 
shape of the hedonic price function derived from the theoretical model. The empirical 
model used is in fact a very popular econometric specification. Nevertheless, it would be 
desirable to verify these results using another dataset and/or a more complex empirical 
model. 
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Appendix 
 
Data 
 
The dataset contains 546 observations on sales prices of houses sold during 
July, August and September (1987) in the city of Windsor, Canada (source: 
Anglin and Gencay, 1996). 
 
The following variables are available: 
 
price (P): sale price of a house 
lotsize (LOT): the lot size of a property in square feet 
bedrooms (BED): number of bedrooms 
bathrms (BATH): number of full bathrooms 
stories (STO): number of stories excluding basement 
driveway (DRI): dummy, 1 if the house has a driveway 
recroom (RER): dummy, 1 if the house has a recreational room 
fullbase (FIB): dummy, 1 if the house has a full finished basement 
gashw (GWH): dummy, 1 if the house uses gas for hot water heating 
airco (CAC): dummy, 1 if there is central air conditioning 
garagepl (GAR): number of garage places  
prefarea (PRN): dummy, 1 if located in preferred neighbourhood of the city 
 
 
summary statistics:                                                                          
                                                                                 
Variable |     Obs        Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max                  
---------+-----------------------------------------------------                  
   price |     546     68121.6   26702.67      25000     190000                  
 lotsize |     546    5150.266   2168.159       1650      16200                  
bedrooms |     546    2.965201   .7373879          1          6                  
 bathrms |     546    1.285714   .5021579          1          4                  
 stories |     546    1.807692   .8682025          1          4                  
driveway |     546    .8589744   .3483672          0          1                  
 recroom |     546    .1776557   .3825731          0          1                  
fullbase |     546    .3498168   .4773493          0          1                  
   gashw |     546    .0457875   .2092157          0          1                  
   airco |     546    .3168498    .465675          0          1                  
garagepl |     546    .6923077   .8613066          0          3                  
prefarea |     546    .2344322   .4240319          0          1       
 
 
 
Estimation results 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     546 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 11,   534) =  105.03 
       Model |  51.5755541    11  4.68868673           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  23.8376161   534  .044639731           R-squared     =  0.6839 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.6774 
       Total |  75.4131702   545  .138372789           Root MSE      =  .21128 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    ln_price |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  ln_lotsize |   .3129159   .0269214    11.62   0.000      .260031    .3658007 
 ln_bedrooms |   .0887915   .0437256     2.03   0.043     .0028962    .1746868 
  ln_bathrms |   .2637722   .0312154     8.45   0.000     .2024521    .3250923 
  ln_stories |   .1652339    .024935     6.63   0.000     .1162513    .2142166 
    driveway |   .1095447   .0283597     3.86   0.000     .0538344     .165255 
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     recroom |    .059703   .0261513     2.28   0.023     .0083309    .1110751 
    fullbase |   .0956443   .0216553     4.42   0.000     .0531043    .1381843 
       gashw |   .1733505    .044116     3.93   0.000     .0866883    .2600126 
       airco |   .1707837   .0212669     8.03   0.000     .1290066    .2125608 
    garagepl |    .048916   .0115416     4.24   0.000     .0262436    .0715884 
    prefarea |   .1296759   .0227795     5.69   0.000     .0849275    .1744243 
       _cons |   7.920482   .2191781    36.14   0.000     7.489925    8.351039 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of ln_price 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 531) =      0.76 
                  Prob > F =      0.5184 
 
 
test  ln_lotsize = 1 
         
F(  1,   534) =  651.36 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
 
test ln_bedrooms = 1 
         
F(  1,   534) =  434.27 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
 
test  ln_bathrms = 1 
         
F(  1,   534) =  556.27 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
 
test  ln_stories = 1 
        
F(  1,   534) = 1120.76 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
 
 17 
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
De
n
si
ty
10 10.5 11 11.5 12 12.5
ln_price
Kernel density estimate
Normal density
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.0949
Kernel density estimate
 
 
 
-
1
-
.
5
0
.
5
1
R
e
si
du
a
ls
10.5 11 11.5 12
Fitted values
 
 
 
